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The returns to talent or performance have grown over time in developed countries. Is talent concentrated
in a few firms or are firms virtual microcosms of the economy, each having close to identical distributions
of talent?
The data show that talent is not concentrated in a few companies, but is widely dispersed across companies.
 Wage dispersion within firms is nearly as high as the wage dispersion overall.  The standard deviation
of wages within the firm is about 80% of the standard deviation across all workers in the economy.
 Firms are more similar than they are dissimilar, but they are not identical: the firm mean wage displays
considerable dispersion across the population of firms.
There is evidence that talent is becoming more concentrated over time within some firms relative to
others.  In four countries that estimated wage regressions with firm fixed effects, the firm fixed effects
are contributing more to the R-squared of the wage regression over time.  Law firms have more lawyers
than janitors.  Janitorial firms have more janitors than lawyers and the differences between firms have
become more pronounced.  Still, the variance of wages within the average firms remains high. 
Edward P. Lazear














The variance of wages across individuals is a summary statistic that means many things.  
Wage variance is an indicator of income inequality: high variance suggests high income inequality.  
But the “wage structure” of an economy – or the mean and the variance of wages – is also an 
indicator of the degree to which some individuals invest in human capital, the degree to which they 
work hard in response to incentives, the rates of return to human capital investments, and 
institutional factors that shape wage determination.  Thus far, economists have had data on the 
distribution of wages across individuals in the economy, but not on the distribution of wages across 
individuals within firms.  Now with new matched employer-employee data sets, we can look at the 
structure of wages within firms as well as across firms.  New questions can be raised and addressed 
empirically.    
Every country has wage variation across individuals.  Not all workers earn the same amount. 
Think about the following questions: 
1.  Is there wage variance because workers find themselves in different firms, some of which are 
high wage firms while other firms are low wage firms? That is, is there a high variance of 
mean wages across firms, or are mean wages of firms quite similar across firms? 
2.  Is there wage variance across individuals because within every firm, some workers are 
highly paid and others are less well paid?   
3.  Do all firms have the same wage structure or are wage structures widely varying across 
firms?  That is,  do some firms have a wage structure that is very compressed – paying low 
and high-wage workers very similar wages – while other firms have a very dispersed or 
high-variance structure of wages within the firm?  If some wage structures within firms are 
more compressed than others, what factors account for differences across firms?   Do most 
firms specialize in a narrow range of jobs, so the structure of pay looks very different across 
firms?  Does the boundary of the firm matter?  When there is pay compression, does it result 
in losses of the most able workers or of the retention of the least able? 
4.  The distribution of income is always skewed across individuals within for a country—it has 
a long upper tail.  Is this because salaries within firms are skewed or does the skewness 
result from a few firms paying high wage levels?  Skewness is relevant in the context of 
tournament theory, which suggests that there should be skewness within firms, since salary   3
jumps at the higher end of the skill hierarchy are greater than salary jumps at the lower end 
of the hierarchy as a reward for effort. 
We can ask similar questions about wage growth rates, or pay raises, for individuals:  
1.  Are average pay raises very different across firms, so that finding employment in a high-
growth firm insures a person of high wage growth? 
2.  Are pay raises uniform within firms or are some workers treated very differently from 
others?  It is possible that workers’ raises within firms are nearly identical – moving lockstep 
across workers when conditions change for the firm – so that differences in wage growth 
across workers in the economy is accounted for primarily by firm differences in mean 
growth rates.  It is also possible that mean wage growth rates are very similar across firms, 
but that significant within-firm variation produces the economy’s variation in wage growth 
rates. 
Answers to these questions are revealing.  For example, if wage levels are very different across 
firms, then firms must be sorting workers based on individual workers levels of human capital or 
their effort levels, and moreover, workers can improve their pay only by moving across firms.  On 
the other hand, if mean wages are very similar across firms but wage variance is high within firms, 
then human capital development within firms and promotions within firms are predominant features 
of the labor market.  Furthermore, if pay increases are very different across workers within the same 
firm, then effort and skills are being heavily rewarded within firms. 
Finally, do the answers to these questions vary across countries?  Do wage structures appear 
to vary significantly across countries as a function of different institutions or human capital?  
Ultimately, the answers might reflect difference sources of productivity in firms.  So, do the patterns 
help explain differences in productivity across countries? 
Until very recently, it would be impossible to answer these questions because the answers 
would require data on all of the workers in a firm for a large number of firms.  Now, this required 
data is available from a number of different countries to answer many of these questions and more.  
The employer-employee matched data sets, from many European countries and from the U.S., either 
contain information on nearly all workers and firms in that country or information on all workers 
within a large subset of firms.  As a result, it is possible to examine the worker’s position in the 
context of his or her entire firm.  Additionally, the existence of data for a large number of firms   4
permits new questions, like those listed above, to be addressed.  
This is not the first time such questions have been asked.  The first economics paper on this 
subject is Lazear (1992).  That study made use of a complete data set on one large firm and studied 
both wages and mobility.  The work was followed by similar papers by Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994,a,b).  They studied a different company and also examined the structure of 
promotion, ports of entry, and wages.  The advantage of those analyses is that it is possible to 
examine the entire firm, thereby analyzing promotion paths, determinants and consequences, as well 
as wage determination and structure.  The disadvantage is that because the studies only cover two 
different firms, it is difficult to generalize the results and not all results are consistent across papers.  
  It is important, therefore, to have data not only on entire firms and all workers in them, but 
on a large number of firms so that results can be generalized.  The authors in this book have used the 
new style of data to ask and answer questions that cannot be answered with traditional data sets.  For 
example, many of these data sets can be used to calculate returns to experience and tenure and can 
perhaps do it better because of their richness. In this book, we have steered away from some 
questions because they are addressed well by traditional individual-level panel data sets that use the 
individual as the unit of analysis and sample randomly from a large population.  Those data sets 
have very few observations from the same firm and in most cases, the identity of firm is unknown.  
As a consequence, neither a firm=s wage structure nor its hiring and promotion patterns can be 
gleaned from traditional data.  Our focus is on exactly the questions that could not be answered 
historically using individual panel data.  
In this introduction we set out to do two things.  First, we use the data from all countries to 
address the questions, drawing out general patterns about firm wage structure, promotion, hiring and 
mobility patterns to answer the questions posed above and more.  Second, because this kind of 
analysis is new and because we are covering a large number of countries and studies in this 
introduction, we aim to raise as many questions as we provide answers.  But the questions 
themselves may be useful, if for no other reason than they cast light on the kinds of issues that can 
be addressed with this type of data. 
This study is based on the extensive empirical work done by all of the country-specific 
authors in this book.   The authors provided to us statistics that they each constructed to be as 
comparable as possible across countries, so that we might identify patterns across countries (though   5
differences in the underlying data sets do not make these statistics perfectly comparable, as 
described below).  However, in this Introduction, we make no attempt to delve deeply into the 
sources of differences across countries.  The individual country chapters describe the primary 
institutional features of the countries, and the macroeconomic conditions.  In addition, the country 
chapter authors provide much greater expertise and analysis of data that is specific to the countries 
(such as the occupational structures of firms or productivity information).   After a broad description 
of the data next, we then look at the structure of wage levels and at alternative models of interpreting 
these structures.  After that, we turn to wage growth rates and mobility.   
2.  The Data  
The data come from all of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden) 
and from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands as well as the United States.  The 
sampling frames are different across countries.  In a broad fashion, we can group the data of the 
countries into five basic sampling schemes, as shown in Table 1.  The sequence of data is as follows. 
 At the top of the list are the country data sets that cover most of the populations, and then 
descending in the table are data sets that cover subsets of the population are covered in the data.  For 
example, at the top of the list are Denmark, Norway, and the U.S., because they have data on all 
workers in all firms in the economy (though for a subset of states in the U.S.).  Next, Finland, 
Sweden, Belgium have data on all workers in large firms; Germany and Norway (using more 
matched data) have data on all workers in manufacturing.  Italy and France cover all firms, but 
within firms they have only a sample of workers, not data on every worker.
1 Finally, additional 
analysis is done for Norway and Sweden for white and blue collar workers, because additional 
detailed matched data is available for these groups. 
Table 1 also provides a brief summary of the key wage variables and the age or time 
restrictions on the data, but for more detailed analysis of the country-specific differences, see 
Appendix Table A1.  Inevitably, variables differ, as in how wages are measured (with or without 
bonuses, hourly or salary, monthly or annual), and these differences naturally enter the statistical 
comparisons that we make.  In addition to the descriptions in Appendix Table A1, each paper 
describes its own data in detail.    
                                                 
1 Italy has a 1/90 sample within firms, so the Italian authors provide information on synthetic firms by taking data from 
similar industries and locations and blending them into cells, which they treat as firms.  France has a 1/25 sample, so we   6
Appendix Tables A2 and A3 contain basic descriptive statistics for all the countries for the 
key variables that are used in the figures below.    
The key to constituting an employer-employee matched data set is that there is substantial 
information on a cross-section of workers within each firm spanning many firms.  This is essential  
to drawing inferences about wage structure, worker mobility, and promotion and hiring patterns 
within and across firms.   
3.  Primary Findings 
The main finding is that countries are remarkably similar in their structures of wages levels 
and of wage changes.  Given the similarity of the wage structures across countries, we reach some 
general conclusions based on the data.  The Discussion section at the end of the chapter introduces 
more policy conclusions on why these empirical regularities matter.    
1.  There is a striking amount of wage variation within firms: the within firm wage variation is 
about 60 to 80 percent of the wage dispersion across all individuals in the economy.  There is 
also variation across firms in the mean wages they pay: the standard deviation of the mean 
wages of firms is about 60 percent of the standard deviation across all individuals. However, 
when we scale the mean wages firms pay relative to the average worker’s wage in the 
economy, one standard deviation in firm means is only 15-20 percent of the average wage: 
firms don’t differ that much in what they pay. Overall, despite very different labor 
institutions across countries, the evidence favoring high within-firm wage dispersion appears 
across countries. 
2.  The across (or ‘between’) firm differences in wages appears to be growing over time.  That 
is, for a significant number of countries, the firm-specific fixed effects are explaining a 
larger percent of the distribution of wages across firms.  This may be because firms are 
increasingly segregated according to the skills that they require.  Or it may be that firms that 
pay high-level efficiency wages (in exchange for skills or low turnover) are increasingly 
diverging from those that are pushed to low-level market clearing wages in lower-skilled or 
highly competitive industries.  Or it may also reflect the boundaries of the firm associated 
with outsourcing: the high-skill firms now use more outsourcing for their low skill jobs.   
3.  With respect to wage growth, although firms differ in the average raises they give in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
correct statistics for this sampling.   7
particular year, firms do not tie all workers to the same percentage point raise within the 
firm.  The standard deviation of raises within firm is between 10 and 20 percentage points, 
even when the average wage increase for the firm is close to zero.  This is most consistent 
with the view that firms respond to outside pressure (either market or governmental) to raise 
workers= wages commensurate with some occupational or skill standard; firms are not raising 
all workers’ wages equally in response to the conditions within the firm. 
4.  Mobility levels differ across countries, but even here, mobility patterns seem relatively 
consistent.  High wage firms have low turnover. Large firms are higher wage and lower 
entry. 
 
4.  Decomposing Wage Variance 
Return to the question raised at the outset, how much do firms differ?  Figure 1 depicts the 
two extremes views of the variance of wage levels within and across firms.  In Figure 1A, all firms 
are identical, so the variance of wages for each firm is the same as the variance of wages for the 
country.  At the other extreme, in Figure 1B, all firms differ, so the variance of wages within firms is 
very narrow and the variance of wages for the country arises from differences in the variance of 
mean wages across firms.   
The different sources of wage variation in Figure 1 can be decomposed more systematically 
which is useful later in interpreting the sources of wage variation. Decompose the variance of wages 
across individuals into the contribution of firms: 
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Where pj is the share of workers in the economy who are working in firm j, 
2
j σ  is the variance of 
wages in firm j,  j w  is the mean wage for firm j (across its workers), and  . w  is the mean wage for the 
entire economy (across its workers and firms). Thus, the variance of wages for the economy will be 
high if: 1) mean wages differ across firms, so  . w wj −  is large (as in Figure 1A), or if 2) the within 
firm variance of wages, 
2
j σ  is large (as in Figure 1B), or if both are true (not drawn in a figure). 
 
The wage structure underlying Figure 1 assumes that firms have identical wage variance 
within each firm.  Figure 2 depicts a more likely structure.  In that figure, the variance of wages is 
not only different across firms, but rises with the mean wage of the firm.  There are numerous   8
reasons for the positive correlation between wage level and variance, such as rising levels of human 
capital in firms, that are introduced later.  
 
5. The Structure of Wages: Wage Levels 
To get started, let us point out some initial observations.  There are two (among many) ways 
in which data have been displayed by the authors of this book.  The first is to use the individual as 
the unit of analysis.  The second, and way most unique to this structure, is to use the firm as the unit 
of analysis.  Table A1 does the comparison.  Here, the average level of wages, the standard 
deviations, and 90
th and 10
th percentile are displayed.  The units are own country currencies so 
comparisons cannot be made across countries without conversions to ratios or other unit-free 
numbers.  The mean level of average wages in the firm based data is always lower than that of the 
mean for the individual based data, although there is some variation in ratios across countries (see 
Tables in the country chapters).  This reflects weighting.  If all firms were of identical size, then the 
firm average would equal the individual average.  The fact that the firm mean is below the individual 
mean implies that the largest firms, which account for disproportionately more workers, have higher 
average wages than the smaller firms.  The firm average, which does not weight by firm size, puts 
relatively more emphasis on the small firms and pulls the average wage down.  That firm size and 
average wage are correlated is not a new result.  (Brown and Medoff; 1989, Fox 2007, ). 
The key question raised above is, how does the variation in wages within and across firms 
contribute to the variation in wages for the country.  First, if all firms were alike, then their wage 
distributions would be identical to the distribution for the country as a whole as shown in Figure 1A. 
At the other extreme, firms might treat their workers very similarly within the firm, and the variation 
in wages throughout the country could be accounted for by differences in the mean value of wages 
between firms, as shown in Figure 1B.   
 We begin by displaying wage distributions for some typical countries.  Consider the patterns 
illustrated by Norway, France, and Denmark (as typical countries) in Figure 3.  In Figure 3, there are 
wage distributions displayed for three typical firms.  The Low Wage Below 10%pt distribution is 
represents the wage distribution for firms in the sample that have mean wages below the 10
th   9
percentile of the wage distribution of firms’ mean wages.
2  The other two firm types are the firms 
Around Median Wage (in the 45
th to 55
th percentile of the firm mean wage distribution), and the 
High Wage Above 90thpt.  The bold line is the distribution for all individuals in the data.   
Norway’s situation is typical and is a compromise between Figure 1A and Figure 1B.  Firms 
have very considerable wage dispersion within them, though not as high as the wage dispersion 
across all individuals in the economy.  The typical firm is not the almost spiked distribution as 
shown in Figure 1B.  However, the wage distribution for the typical firm that is below the 10
th 
percentile is tighter than that for the country as a whole.  The same is true for the wage distribution 
of the typical firm around the median and for the firm with mean wages in the top 10% of firms.
3  
While wage dispersion within firms is very high, firms have many different jobs within the firm.  As 
a result of differences in the means, the wage distributions of high wage and low wage firms are by 
and large disjoint. At the mean, some of these firms have low pay low skill; some have high pay 
high skill (or high variance). But the high variance of wages within firms causes wage distributions 
of firms with very different means to overlap. 
Figures 4 through 6 summarize these primary results across countries on the structure of 
wages.  Figure 4 graphs the ratio of the average of the within-firm standard deviation of wages 
divided by the country’s standard deviation of wages.  Figure 4 shows that, on average, the 
dispersion of wages within firms is about 60% to 80% of the total wage dispersion for the country 
(across individuals).  Figure 5 graphs the ratio of the standard deviation of the mean wages of the 
firms divided by the country’s mean wage.   By this measure, it appears that firms don’t differ much 
in their mean wages – the standard deviation is only 10 to 20% of the average wage for the country.  
However, the dispersion of mean wages for firms is high relative to the overall dispersion of means: 
the standard deviation of mean wages of the firms is about 60% of the total wage dispersion for the 
country (Figure 6).   
Thus, these figures show that – across all countries – the structure of wages is a compromise 
between Figures 1A and 1B.  There is very high wage dispersion within firms.  But the mean wages 
                                                 
2 In these figures, each distribution is a graph of the normal distribution given the mean wage and standard deviation for 
that subsample.  
3The typical firm was constructed by averaging the mean and standard deviat graphs the mean wage and the within firm 
standard deviation of wages for all the ion of log wages for firms in the 0-10th percentile, the 45-55th percentile and the 
90
th and above percentile. The distributions were constructed assuming that wages are distributed log normally.   10
of firms also differ considerably: there are high wage firms and there are low wage firms.  The figure 
for Norway, Figure 3, is very representative of the structure of wages across countries.   
What is especially striking about these results is that it is true across all countries.
4   Figure 7 
expands upon these two points by providing the average coefficients of variation for within firms 
across all countries.  Countries are remarkably similar: for the average firm, the standard deviation 
of wages is about 25% of the mean wage.  For example, Finland has considerably different firms in 
that the firms with larger internal wage dispersion have coefficients of variation equal to about .35, 
whereas those with little internal wage dispersion have coefficients of around .15.  But the average is 
around .25, which is about the same value as the average value for almost all countries. The average 
firm across Europe has a standard deviation of wages that is about one-fourth the wage of that firm.  
This is slightly higher in some countries and slightly lower in others, but the variation is small 
relative to the within-country differences in coefficients of variation for wages.  Whether this reflects 
some kind of universal constant remains to be determined.   
Thus, despite different labor market institutions, countries do not differ dramatically in their 
wage patterns.  Does it imply that there is a typical skill distribution for all countries and these are 
reflected in the coefficient of variation that is seen for the country as a whole?  Or does it imply that 
wage policies vary across firms, but tend to average out at the country level because firms adopt the 
same distribution of wage polices irrespective of country?  These questions remain open ones, but 
we turn to themes that describe the wage patterns.   
6.  The Structure of Wages: Some Themes 
What do these results tell us about our basic models of the determination of wages and 
productivity across workers?  To answer, we begin by identifying three different models of wage 
setting that permeate the literature.  Given these models, we then ask, why do workers differ within 
firms, and why do firms differ?   
The best known theory of wage setting is human capital theory, which states in its most basic 
form, that workers are paid on the basis of their general skills and that these skills can be measured 
as a scaler, meaning that there is one skill and everything can be expressed in efficiency units of that 
skill.  The wage equation for individual wages is:  
                                                 
4 The low number belongs to Italy and the Italian data contain synthetic firms which are closer to a random draw from the 
overall population.  This reduces reported dispersion below the amount that would be present in real firms.    11
(2) wijt = β0 +  β1 Educijt + β2 Experijt  
where wages for person i in firm j at time t are a function of his education, experience.  Were human 
capital the only determinant of wages, then it would not matter at all in which firm a worker finds 
himself.  The competitive labor market would require that all firms pay the worker exactly the same 
thing, irrespective of the firm in which he works.  Otherwise, other firms could easily steal him away 
by paying a slightly higher wage and capturing the profits.  This is most easily described as a spot 
market view of the labor market, where competition forces workers to be paid on the basis of the 
productivity, which is in turn reflected perfectly in measurable skills.  The β1 and β2 in (2) measure 
the rates of return to skills.   
The human capital model of wage setting does not tell us why wages differ within or across 
firms because firms are irrelevant.  Firms matter if we add a model of worker sorting across firms 
and thus of differences in the underlying production functions of firms.  Table 2 lays out the 
alternatives.  In column 1, there is large wage dispersion within firms and all firms are identical 
(mimicking Figure 1A).  There is high wage dispersion within firms if the within-firm production 
function requires a combination of workers with different skills to optimally produce output.  The 
appropriate model of the firm would be one in which workers within the firm have complementary 
skills, as in models of teamwork or of hierarchy.
5  In contrast, if firms differ by occupation, then 
workers are likely to be sorted by occupation or skill: the within-firm wage dispersion is low, but 
there are large differences in mean wages across firms (as in column 2 of Table 2).   Lastly, it is 
likely that mean wages and the variance of wages are positively correlated: high human capital firms 
(like law firms or large businesses) are more likely to have teams or hierarchies that produce higher 
wage variance than low-wage low human capital firms.  A law firm will have high-wage lawyers 
and lower-wage assistants and janitors, but a janitorial service firm will have few high-paid 
managers.  This theoretical positive correlation between the mean wage and variance is displayed in 
Figure 2.   
An alternative model of wage setting, a purely institutional theory of wage determination, 
also has the implication that a worker’s wage is independent of firm in which he is employed.  
                                                 
5 See Lazear(1999) for a model of complementary team workers, and Hubbard (2006) for a model of complementary 
workers within a hierarchy.     12
Suppose that wages were set by a central authority and the authority set the wage based on the 
worker’s occupational title, where his occupational title was determined by his worker 
characteristics.  For example, a particular level of experience and educational background could be 
used to determine occupational status using some index such as:  
(3) wijt = β0 +  b Educijt + c Experijt  
Although the index might look similar to a human capital wage function, there need be no direct 
relation of the coefficients b and c to anything having to do with productivity.  The central authority, 
such as union, might simply determine that the selected weights b and c are appropriate in some 
sense, based on equity or any other consideration.  In the institutional model, the sharing of rents 
between the worker and firm is determined by institutional rules (such as those set by union 
negotiations).  
As in the human capital model, the institutional model predicts wage dispersion within firms 
if firms contain many occupations, or, alternatively, predicts very different mean wages across firms 
if firms are organized by occupation or industry (comparing the predictions of columns 1 and 2 of 
row 2 in Table 2).  The institutional model differs from the human capital model in that the 
underlying model of wage setting is quite different despite similar predictions.  In an institutional 
model of wage setting, pay dispersion may arise within the firm if pay rises with seniority, even if all 
workers have the same level of human capital.  Alternatively, workers may have very different levels 
of human capital, but the same wages within the firm, if unions compress all wages to be equal.  
Firm profitability also enters.  If negotiated pay is a function of the profitability of the firm, there 
will be little wage dispersion within the firm, but very different mean wages across firms as a 
function of profits.  In this case, “a rising tide lifts all boats:” rising profits raise the pay for all 
workers in the firm and there is no wage dispersion within the firm.    
Finally, firms can have ‘wage policies’ that are aimed at incentives for effort or at optimal 
sorting and that thereby affect wage dispersion.  Most wage policies that are aimed at pay for 
performance will increase wage dispersion within firms.  That is true of piece rates policies or of 
implicit contract theories that create divergence between wages and productivity.  Consider first the 
piece rate model, in which a firm pays a piece rate that is given by:  
(4)  Payijt = a + b Outputijt   13
The higher is b, the greater is the amount of effort that a worker puts into a job.
6  Thus, if workers 
differ in skills or in effort, then piece rate pay accentuates the variance of pay within firms.  
Similarly, tournaments models increase within-firm pay variance as well.  Tournament models 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981), which are most applicable to white collar workers, suggest that wage 
structures within firms serve incentive purposes and that it is the hierarchical structure of 
accelerating wages at each level, rather than the current wage that determines the strength of the 
incentives.  In tournament theories, workers at higher levels of the firm’s hierarchy receive pay that 
has impacts on those below them.  Lower level workers want to become higher level workers and 
their desire to climb the internal job ladder depends on the raise that workers receive when they are 
promoted (non-monetary as well as monetary).  Since the optimal size of the raise depends on 
internal conditions like the riskiness of the activity and the shape of the firm’s hierarchy and the 
firm’s production function, tournament theory suggests that workers will be treated differently in 
different types of firms, even when the workers have the same basic characteristics.  Overall, 
tournaments increase pay dispersion within firms, holding fixed the level of human capital. 
Wage policies, such as forms of incentive pay, can also cause striking differences in mean 
wages across firms due to worker sorting.
7   Firms offering incentive pay are also the high-wage 
high-effort firms.  Those firms without incentive pay are low-wage low-effort, and thus there is 
variance of mean wages across firms when workers preferring the high effort firm sort to those and 
others do not (as summarized in column 2 of Table 2).  These differences in mean wages and 
incentives reflect differences in the production environment that determines the value of incentive 
pay.   
In sum, these models suggest at least two possible reasons why firms might have significant 
within-firm variation in wages.  First, and most obvious, is that workers are different.  The workers 
that firms employ within are not identical and as a result, wages reflect the skill heterogeneity of the 
workers within the firm.  Those wages might be determined completely externally, either by a 
                                                 
6 The worker maximizes: a + b (output)  - C(output), where C(output) is the effort cost of producing a given output level 
and where C=>0.  The first order condition is C=(output) = b.  Since C=>0, increasing b increases the amount of effort. 
 
7 For example, see Bentley McLeod and Malcolmson (1989), Stole and Jeffrey Zweibel (1996) for models of 
bargaining theories, where the outside alternatives as well as the worker’s value to the firm affect the actual wage 
level, and thus create differences in what firms pay.   14
competitive labor market process, in the extreme by a spot market, or by a centralized wage setter, 
like a government or tripartite (labor, management, government) body. If worker skills are different 
within firms, and wages are set externally, then wages within firms will reflect the underlying skill 
distributions within them.  
Alternatively, the wage variance within the firm might reflect wage policy not skill 
heterogeneity.  Even if all workers were identical ex ante, a wage policy could result in paying 
different wages to different people.  This happens in a tournament, for example, where pay is more 
dispersed than ex ante talent and where the relation of pay to ex post output is positive, but with a 
correlation far from one.  In the other direction is that wages may be more compressed than ex ante 
ability.  Pay compression might simply reflect wage policy of the firm.  It is well-known, for 
example, that certain institutions, like labor unions, compress wages relative to non-union firms.  It 
is also possible that wage setting in a centralized or negotiated environment might result in wage 
compression that brings up the wages of the least skilled and cuts the wages of the most skilled.  
There is no reason why this pattern would necessarily be uniform across firms, industries or 
occupations.  Thus, pay policy is another variable that lies behind the within-firm wage distribution. 
It is key to try to disentangle these alternative explanations.  That takes us beyond this 
introductory analysis, but in the next sections, we will describe evidence that speaks to these 
differences and will try to suggest additional questions or lines of research that might assist in 
obtaining answers.   
 
7.  The Structure of Wages: Disentangling the Themes 
The data shows that across all countries there is very significant wage dispersion within 
firms.  However, firms are different: mean wages vary considerably.   
We cannot identify whether the wage dispersion within firms is due to the heterogeneity of 
skills within firms or due to wage policies of incentive pay that increase pay variance.  However, 
some forms of wage policies can be rejected.  We have two pieces of evidence rejecting the 
possibility that firms compress pay within the firm (relative to market-level wage rates).  The first is 
the correlation between firms’ mean wages and firms’ spread in wages within each firm.  Second is 
the correlation between the wage spread in the firm and worker mobility.   
7.1 Wage Level and Wage Variance   15
There is a positive correlation between the log wage and the within-firm variance of the log 
wage (Figure 8).  The correlation ranges between .1 and .3 across countries.  There are a number of 
interpretations of this finding. Two are worth mentioning.  The first is causal; the second is 
statistical.   
One causal explanation is the human capital story: firms that have high levels of human 
capital are more likely to have a high-within firm variance of human capital.  The second causal 
explanation is more subtle, regarding wage policy.  Apparently, firms are rejecting policies of pay 
compression in favor of policies of within-firm incentives and human capital growth.  A policy of 
pay compression – or egalitarian pay and compressed incentives – could arise in large firms with 
high mean wages.  Such a policy of pay compression could increase performance if it enhances 
teamwork and workers are very complementary (or have high amounts of firm-specific human 
capital).  However, such a policy could be harmful to productivity—it would induce adverse sorting 
and adverse incentives: the top performers would sort out of the firm and would work less hard if the 
firm lacks tournaments or piece rate pay.
8  The data rejects pay compression: high wage firms are 
also high incentive, high human capital firms.  In the next subsection, we provide evidence on 
mobility that also rejects the pay compression model.   
A second explanation for the correlation between average wage and its standard deviation is 
purely statistical.  It is well known that the distribution of wages is positively skewed: there is 
significant positive skew in worker ability.  Suppose that firms are partitions of the overall income 
distribution.  A positive correlation between average and standard deviation of wage would result.  
For example, suppose that wage distribution is partitioned into two firms: the bottom 50% of wage 
earners work for the low-wage firm and the top 50% worked for the high wage firm.  The high wage 
firm would have higher variance due to the positive skew of the overall income distribution.  Thus, if 
there are low and high wage firms due to people sorting by human capital levels across firms, the 
skewness of the wage distribution will produce a positive correlation between wages levels and 
                                                 
8 The sorting mechanism is more important at the firm level than at the country level.  Within country, between country 
there is less sorting than between firms within a country.  Workers who do not like pay compression in Sweden might 
choose to move to Denmark,  but less readily than those at Volvo move to Saab.  As a result, the correlation between 
average wage and variance in wage might be expected to be stronger within county than between. (It is difficult to 
compare wages across countries because of exchange rates, ppp issues of non-tradeable goods, etc.)   16
variance.
9   
Finally, the basic results – of positively correlated mean and wage variance – rules out the 
“extreme sorting” of workers into firms according to either their occupation, skill, or effort level. 
Even within the high-wage firms, there are lower wage workers: high-wage firms are not just firms 
of lawyers or high-tech programmers.  Law firms must have janitors, but building cleaning 
contracting firms need not have lawyers.   
 
7.2 Wage Level and Worker Mobility 
A key determinant of whether within-firm wage variation reflects wage policy or underlying 
characteristics is the pattern of mobility.  For example, consider a firm that has a small standard 
deviation of the log of wages.  This could reflect a policy of pay compression or it could reflect a 
homogeneous work force.  If it is pay compression that hurts the top relative to the bottom, then the 
top workers should be more likely to leave the firm than the bottom workers.  If we find a pattern 
where firms with tight wage distributions also have disproportionate exit of the highest paid 
workers, then the inference that we would draw is that the pay compression is policy.  Conversely, if 
low wage workers have their pay increased relative to the market in such firms, then they should be 
less likely to leave. There would be no reason for top workers to leave disproportionately nor for 
bottom workers to stay disproportionately if all were paid their competitive wage.   
Figure 9 provides some evidence.  The exit rates of workers who are highly paid but work in 
compressed pay firms are lower than the exit rates of top workers in non-compressed firms.  If these 
findings hold up, they would suggest that the pattern observed reflects worker heterogeneity more 
than it does wage policy. That is, firms that have more compressed wages have a more homogeneous 
work force and within that work force there is less difference between the top workers and the 
median workers.  As a result, top workers are less likely to be underpaid in that environment and less 
likely to exit.  Overall, we do not find evidence that pay compression in firms is pushing out more 
skilled workers.  We leave it to future research to disentangle the relationship between compression 
                                                 
9 The positive skew could be due to luck or effort, or both.  Assume the firm has a wage policy of incentive pay. When 
the firm gets ‘lucky’ the incentive pay rewards all those within the firm, but it rewards the highest paid the most.  And 
extreme example of this would be stock options.  For example, Microsoft was a high wage and a high wage variance firm 
due to options and incentive pay.  When Microsoft got ‘lucky’ many within Microsoft did well.  Since greater amounts of 
stock options and incentives are given out to those at the highest pay levels, there is a positive correlation between pay 
level and variance.  Researchers could examine the role of ‘luck’ by looking more closely at the role of individual fixed   17
and mobility.
10   
In sum, firms that allow high wage spread also have higher wages.  This pushes a 
productivity interpretation: firms that allow disparate wage treatment also reap the benefit through 
incentive and selection effects of higher productivity. Firms that compress wages drive out their best 
workers and stifle incentives to produce.  However, workers don’t exit more in compressed wage 
firms.  Apparently, firms with compressed wages also have higher wage levels or lower skill levels.  
 But across all countries, we find no evidence that policies of pay compression are reducing 
productivity.   
 The general conclusion from this section is that there is considerable within firm variance in 
wages in all countries.  Although firms differ considerably within a country, both in terms of average 
wage and in terms of wage spread, there is a significant amount of variation within each firm.  Some 
of this reflects differences in workers within each firm, but some may reflect wage policy.  At this 
point it is difficult to distinguish, but the wage compression evidence points more to heterogeneity 
than to wage policy.  
 
8.  Wage Growth 
Alternative views of the sources of wage growth build directly from the themes developed 
above in studying the variation in wage levels across and within firms.  Imagine Figure 1 as a picture 
of the distribution of wage growth rates rather than wage levels.  At one extreme is Figure 1B, in 
which firms have very different mean pay raises.  Firm-specific differences in pay raises would 
arise: when occupational segregation or skill heterogeneity within firms causes some firms to pay 
high raises in response to hot occupational labor markets; when some firms with a policy of pay 
compression pay lower raises due to lower performance; when the profitability of the firm that 
translate into pay differences through institutions or union bargaining.  At the other extreme is 
Figure 1A, in which firms have extreme heterogeneity of wage growth rates within the firm.  These 
within firm differences in wage growth would arise:  when workers build human capital at different 
rates within their careers in the firm; when firms respond to the external labor market pressures for 
                                                                                                                                                             
effects versus firm effects in contributing to high variance income.  
10 Why is pay compression and exit rate negatively correlated?  It could be because large firms have high exit rates, and 
have high but compressed wages.  In these data, exit rates are lower in large firms that have compressed wage structures. 
 It could also be because highly skilled workers avoid compressed pay firms.  Or, it could be that unions compress wages   18
wage growth that vary across the occupations within the firm; when tournaments or incentive 
structures introduce pay raises for effort; or when institutional seniority-based pay structures vary 
across occupations.   
 
8.1 Raises Within and Across Firms 
The data reveals extensive heterogeneity of wage growth both within each economy and 
within most firms.  Within the economy, workers experience very different outcomes: the standard 
deviation of the growth of log wages is much larger than the average level of wage growth for most 
countries (Figure 10).  In most economies, the average growth of wages is 2 to 5 percent, but the 
standard deviation of wages is about 10 to 30 percentage points.  Workers in the 90
th percentile of 
wage increases obtained increases in the range of 15 to 20% in most countries (Appendix Figure 
A1).  Even when wages were not growing that rapidly on average, some workers experienced very 
high wage increases.  This is an interesting fact, and one that could have been learned from standard 
panel data sources.  The advantage of the new data is they enable us to look next at how the firm 
influences these wage changes. 
Within the firm, wage dispersion is also very high.  The within-firm standard deviation in 
wage increases is always larger than the mean wage change and in many countries, very much 
larger: mean wage dispersion ranges from 5 to 15 percentage points (Figure 11).  The within-firm 
dispersion of wage growth is often about 50 percent of the dispersion of wage growth for the 
country.  But it is often more than twice the mean wage growth for the firm.  For example, in 
Denmark, in 2000, average wage growth for the firm was 3.4%.  The within firm standard deviation 
of growth rates was 8%.   
Overall, a very interesting pattern emerges.  The picture for wage levels is mirrored and 
amplified in wage growth.  Figure 12 is the wage growth counterpart to Figure 3 for wage levels.  
Figure 12 shows wage growth distributions for low-wage-growth firms and high-wage-growth firms. 
France has higher wage growth dispersion than does Norway (according to these measures).  But for 
all three countries, the firm is a ‘microcosm’ of the economy – the dispersion of wage growth within 
the firm is strikingly similar to wage growth across firms and individuals.   
Modeling wage growth introduces a role for business cycles.  One common view of business 
                                                                                                                                                             
and raise wages.   19
cycles and economic growth is that when things are good for some, they are good for all.  When the 
economy is good, wages grow for the economy as a whole and every firm and every worker 
experience the same increase in wage growth.  In this extreme view, firms change wages in lock-
step: wages rise or fall at the same rate and same time for all firms.  At the other extreme, the 
relevant unit of analysis is the worker and the state of the economy has little effect on wage growth.  
Each worker’s annual wage increase is an independent draw from some distribution that is a function 
of skills or effort.  The firm wage increase is then aggregation of its workers’ increases and the 
economy as a whole an aggregation of the firms’ increases.  Of course, neither extreme will be true.  
But what our data shows us is that even though mean wage growth varies over time with the state of 
the economy, most workers’ wage increases do not move in lock step with the state of the economy, 
but vary widely in every year regardless of the state of the economy.   
The fact that within-firm variation in wage growth is high suggests a number of things.  First, 
a rising tide does not lift all boats, at least to the same extent.   Second, the fact that wage growth is 
quite varied within the firm suggests that raises are tied to some other factor, like the outside labor 
market.  Lazear and Oyer (2004) find that occupation is a much more important determinant of wage 
growth than is the firm.  At least in Sweden, workers’ wages are more closely related to their skill 
set than to their firms’ fortunes.  The same appears to be true of other countries, because the within 
firm variation in wage growth is so high. High variance of wage growth within the firm also 
suggests high variation in human capital growth or effort across workers within the firm. 
Firms are different, however, in that some firms have much more of a lock-step approach to 
raises than others. Figure 13 plots the standard deviation of the change in log wage for firms with 
that have very high within-firm variation, specifically are in the 90
th percentile of firms’ standard 
deviations of the change in the log wage.  It does the same for firms in the 10
th percentile.  For 
example, in 2000 in Finland, the firms that treated workers most disparately with respect to raises 
had a standard deviation of Δ log wage equal to .15, whereas those that treated workers most 
similarly with respect to raises had a standard deviation of .05.  Some firms have a lock-step raise 
policy.  What one worker gets as a raise, the other workers get as well.  Other firms do not have 
much within firm conformity. 
One key area for future investigation is whether the standard deviation of wage changes 
within the firm is fairly stable over time.  Figure 13 shows that it is remarkably constant over time   20
for the country as a whole.  Whether and why the within-firm standard deviation of raises is stable is 
an area for future research, but a conjecture is that the structure of the firm remains relatively 
constant over time.
11  One way of examining this would be to estimate firm fixed effects in the wage 
growth equation and see if these firm effects are fixed over time, and whether they contribute 
equally to the variance of firm growth over time.
12  
8.2 Raises and Tenure 
Standard in the literature on human capital is that wage growth is more rapid during the early 
years of career than during the later years.  The average wage increase is larger for young workers 
than older workers.  This can come about through a variety of mechanisms.  One is that young 
workers move across more firms than old workers.  The other is that within firms, there is a policy to 
give larger wage increases to young workers than to older ones.  That policy could reflect incentive 
rewards for early effort or human capital growth.  Most academics experience this first hand: 
academic deans invariably send out a letter each year bemoaning the small pool available for raises 
and justifying small senior professor raises by stating that the pool must be reserved to increase the 
wages of more junior professors.  Is this a valid characterization of the typical firm and how general 
is this policy across firms and countries? 
Figure 13 shows the difference between the wage growth rate of high tenure workers and low 
tenure workers within the firm, averaged across firms in the economy.  The difference is almost 
always positive, and in some country-years, it is large. Of course, this is wage growth for those who 
stay in the firm.  Much of the difference in wage growth at the individual level that occurs over the 
life cycle may work through mobility across firms.   
Young workers who are ‘stars’ also receive considerably higher raises than older workers 
who are the stars within the firm.  Figure 14 shows the difference in the wage growth rate among the 
                                                 
11 Wage growth dispersion within the firm should reflect the fact that some occupations enjoy relatively large increases in 
demand during some years, whereas other occupations enjoy large demand increases in other years.  Although it is not 
the same occupation that experiences high wage growth over time, it is true that firms with many occupations are more 
likely to have more disparate wage growth than firms with few occupations.  If so, there will be relative stability in the 
within-firm variance in wage growth, even if occupations switch places in terms of which are treated well or poorly in a 
given year. 
12 Another question is whether firms that have little wage change also have small variance in wage change. It has long 
been known that at the national level, inflation and cross-sectional variation in prices are positively correlated; there is a 
higher variance of wage growth during periods of high inflation. We have not yet investigated this phenomenon, but it is 
possible to do so with these data. 
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th percentile raises among low tenure workers from that of the 90
th percentile of high tenure 
workers within the firm.  The difference is positive and often 2 to 8 percentage points.  This suggests 
more positive skew in the distribution of raises among the young than among the senior. Some 
young workers do very well and may be on a fast track.  To ascertain that, it would be necessary to 
examine the pattern of serial correlation of raises for a given worker over time, which is possible in 
these data but left for another study.   
 
9.  Mobility 
Exit rates vary substantially across firms and countries.  The typical firm’s exit rate varies 
from lows of around 15% in Norway’ Sweden, Finland and early observations for Germany, to highs 
of 35% in France.  However, we caution against comparing exit rate levels across countries for these 
data.  Because the different data sets measure exit over different time intervals and types of jobs, exit 
levels are not comparable.
13  Instead, we focus on within-country correlations.  For example, in 
countries where exit rates are high, entry rates are also high (Figure 15). This must be true to provide 
an equilibrium where approximately the same number of workers are employed over time.
14  
 
9.1 Mobility and Wage Levels 
There is a negative correlation between both exit and entry rates and wage levels (Figure 16). 
 Firms that are high wage firms are also low turnover firms.  This could reflect one of two 
phenomena.  First, high wage firms may pay above the market.  Workers queue for jobs in those 
firms.  When they finally land a job in a high wage firm, they keep it because their alternatives are 
rarely better.  Low wage firms scrape for workers, lose them whenever something better comes 
along, and must have high hiring rates to compensate for the high quit rates. 
An alternative explanation is that high wage firms have more skilled workers and the 
turnover rates for the less skilled are higher than those for the more highly skilled.  Work experience 
could account for this alone.  A firm with many high tenure workers would be expected to have 
lower turnover rates than those with low tenure workers.   
                                                 
13 For example, exit rates based on monthly data will be much higher than those based on annual data because one job 
can have many workers turnover in that job within one year.   
14 There are some notable exceptions.  Germany, during the early 90s, had exit rates that far exceeded entry rates. This 
invariably reflects the re-unification and fundamental changes in the labor market that occurred during that period.   22
A very interesting new fact comes from Figure 17.  Growing firms tend to be low wage 
firms.  The firms with the high entry rates also have the lowest average wages.  The pattern holds 
across countries and over all years, but is stronger in some cases than others. This finding makes 
sense.  New firms are likely to be growing more rapidly than older firms and new firms are also 
likely to be smaller than mature firms.  It is also interesting that the pattern holds across countries. 
 
9.2 Mobility and Firm Size 
Another related and new fact is that exit rates and entry rates in big firms are lower than  the 
exit and entry rates in the average firms.  Figure 18 shows that the exit rates at big firms are about 80 
to 90 percent of the exit rates at average firms.  The pattern is strikingly consistent across countries 
(with a few exceptions).  The same is true of entry rates; there is less hiring at big firms and more 
hiring at small firms relative to the size of the firms.  Figure 19 shows the net entry rate (entry - exit 
rates) and then taking the difference between all firms and big firms.  There is no consistent pattern.  
This neither supports nor rejects Gibrat’s law.  In some country years, there is a pattern of growth 
being lower in large firms.  In other country years the reverse is true.  But the difference is rarely 
zero, which would be the prediction of Gibrat=s Law.  (Given the number of firms in each sub-
sample, the differences shown in Figure 19 are most likely significant in almost all cases.)   
Apparently other factors are important in determining the size distribution of growth rates and the 
statement that growth is independent of firm size seems to be inaccurate.  A more accurate statement 
is that growth rates vary with firm size across time and location. The causal nature remains unknown 
at least for this study. 
The determinants of firm turnover rates (industry, occupation, wage, skill, average tenure, 
etc.) could be investigated.  Although we present no evidence on those factors here, it is a possible to 
perform an analysis of this sort using the country-wide datasets used in this book. 
 
9.3 Firm Mobility and Wage Growth 
If the typical labor market allows for some rent sharing between capital and labor, worker 
wages should rise when firm profits rise.  It is also reasonable to expect that profits and employment 
would be positively related.  Firms that are profitable are likely to be doing more net hiring than 
firms that are unprofitable.  When profits are down, firms typically cut the size of their labor force.    23
As a result, good times might be accompanied by super-normal wage growth and also by super-
normal employment growth.  The cross-country data provide evidence on the correlation between 
wage and employment policy and we believe that this is the first evidence of this sort that cuts across 
many firms. 
Figure 20 reports that the correlation between wage change and entry rates tends to be  
positive.  In a given country-year, firms that are raising wages are also likely to have higher than 
average entry rates.  But firms that are raising wages do not consistently (across country-years) have 
lower exit rates.  In the most open countries, like Denmark, the finding is strong.  High wage growth 
and low exit rates move together.  But in Sweden, the results are weak and in the opposite direction. 
This might reflect the “dot.com Boom” phenomenon.  During the dot.com boom, the typical view 
was that the Silicon Valley labor market was in a talent war.  Programmers and other skilled 
technical workers moved from firm to firm frequently, as demand shifted to reflect the fortunes of 
one company or another.  Firms with rapidly growing wages hired many workers, but also lost them 
to other firms with rapidly growing wages because of the nature of industrial structure.  Turnover 
rates were lower, and wages were increasing less rapidly, in more traditional parts of the economy 
where the situation was closer to stable.  So exit rates and high wage growth might go together if 
they characterize firms that are in industries which are undergoing rapid change.  Again, this is a 
question that requires additional evidence, obtainable in these data sets, but not presented here. 
 
10.  The Structure of Wages: Why Care? Discussion and Summary 
Several results in these data have revealed key features of the employment and wage 
structure of firms that were not previously known.   
•  The general structure of wages is remarkably similar across all countries.  No previous study 
has had the data on employees within firms to assess wage structures across countries.   
•  The wage dispersion within firms is nearly as high as the wage dispersion overall.  The 
standard deviation of wages within the firm is about 80% of the standard deviation across all 
workers in the economy (Figure 4).  In addition, the variance in wage growth rates across 
individuals within the firm is very high.  Even when the average raise is 4 percent within the 
firm, the top 10% of workers will typically receive increases of 8 percent.  Wage levels and 
raises vary considerably across workers within the firm.     24
•  Firms are more similar than they are dissimilar.  The standard deviation of mean wages 
across firms is only about 20% of the average worker’s wage for the economy (Figure 5).  
But firms are not identical: the standard deviation of mean wages is about 60% of the 
standard deviation of all individual wages (Figure 6).   
In sum, most firms have many different jobs within the firm; wage variance is high within 
firms. But the jobs differ across firms. Janitorial firms have lawyers, but few. Law firms have 
janitors, but few. Consequently, mean wages differ across firms. Firms are not microcosms of the 
entire economy, and yet, most firms do reflect a subsample of many of the jobs done in the economy. 
Figure 2 is the more accurate depiction of the sources of wage variance from within and across 
firms; the extremes of Figures 1A and 1B are not evident in the data. Recalling equation (1), the 
variance of wages for the economy combines a high within-firm variance and significant gaps in 
mean wages across firms. 
What do we learn about wage setting policies and worker sorting across firms?  First, there is 
no evidence of extreme sorting of workers across firms.  That is, most firms contain a broad mixture 
of workers’ skills or effort levels within the firm: wage levels vary greatly within the firm and wage 
growth rates vary greatly within the firm.  Moreover, an average worker moving from a low-wage 
firm to a high-wage firm would increase wages by only about 20 percent.  Having said this, one can 
look at the same data and reach a different conclusion.  There are differences in mean wages across 
firms: law firms do not pay the same as cleaning-service firms and people do sort by occupation or 
industry.   
Second, there is sorting within the firm.  High effort or high skilled workers are sorted into 
jobs that pay more within the firm.  High effort workers are rewarded with pay increases, and thus 
sorted into the jobs where they are the most productive.  Again we know this to be true because there 
is a high variance of pay levels and pay increases within firms: firms do not have policies of equal 
pay for all.  Instead, what they have is some combination of: heterogeneous teamwork within the 
firm; systems of incentive pay that reward for effort; and sensitivity of wages to outside market 
conditions for each occupation or individual.  Firms are more hierarchical than homogeneous.  Of 
course, a law firm would not be expected to have the same average wage as a cleaning service firm.  
The differences in skill between these two firms is obvious.  There is also likely to be a difference in 
wage policy: law firms may by choice introduce tournaments models; cleaning service firms may   25
have compressed wages from unionized bargaining.  It may be possible to distinguish skill 
heterogeneity if we estimate models with individual specific and firm effects; given individual 
effects, the residual wage variation across firms represents policy.  We leave it to future researchers 
to work on the underlying wage setting models (extending the work of (Abowd, Kramartz, 
Margolis,1989).  Why does all this matter? We highlight three reasons.   
One reason to care about within-firm variation in wages and even more to the point, worker 
characteristics, is that it may help us learn about the nature of the firm’s production function.  One 
possibility (as shown in Figure 1B) is that workers are almost identical within firm, both in wages 
and in characteristics.  The need for different skills to produce a product might be handled by the 
market, say, where low skilled workers sell the commodity that they produce to more highly skilled 
workers who know how to market and distribute the product.  Alternatively, team production may 
make it essential to have many different types of workers within the same firm.  It may be difficult to 
use the discipline of the market to supervise workers within one firm by workers in another firm.  
The evidence here is that firms are comprised of workers that are more heterogeneous than 
homogeneous, but further work should be done.   
Some analysis suggests that firms are becoming more dissimilar over time.  That is, firms 
that specialize in high-end skills are increasingly different from firms that specialize in low-end 
skills.   The evidence for this is from regressions with firm fixed effects.  In the chapters that 
estimated wage regressions with firm fixed effects, the firm fixed effects are contributing more to the 
R-squared of the wage regression over time.  Thus, increasingly the firm matters more: high wage 
firms are selecting or rewarding the highest skill.  This is an interesting technological change.   
Kremer and Maskin (1996) posit that firms in recent years require more skill segregation across 
firms as a response to skill biased technological change.  In all the countries that study this we have 
evidence lending support to this hypothesis.  In general, a deeper understanding of the wage 
distribution within firms might give us a clue as to the labor ingredients required to produce, how 
those ingredients vary over time and among industries, and might shed some light on the nature of 
team production. 
The ultimate question is whether wage policy specifically and labor policy in general has an 
effect on productivity.  It is conceivable that data of this type might allow investigation of this issue 
within countries and among countries.  Within a country, firms that (randomly) adopt different   26
policies with respect to the types of workers they hire and how they pay them might experience 
different levels of productivity.  For example, some have suggested that firms that limit the levels of 
top salaries relative to its median levels are less productive.  Since the unit of analysis is the pay 
policy of the firm, only these employer-employee data can address issues such as this.  By attaching 
measures of firm productivity or profitability, or in the absence of profitability, firm survival, we 
may get some hints as to the effects of various policies.  For example, if it were found that firms with 
either a too compressed or too disparate wage policy were more likely than firms in the middle to go 
out of business, this would be a starting point.  Then, an examination of the detailed nature of 
turnover at those firms might shed additional light.   
Finally, these data shed new light on workers’ careers.  The fact that there is considerable 
wage variation within firm means that, at least potentially, workers are not locked into a particular 
wage slot as a function of their first job assignment.   If wages were compressed within firms, 
mobility would be necessary to change one’s position, both over the lifecycle and relative to other 
workers.  Luck might play an important role.  If a worker landed in a low-wage firm like the one 
pictured at the far left of Figure 1B, he would have no hope of changing his income without leaving 
the firm.  In an economy where mobility is costly (either as a result of market forces or government 
mandated severance pay that makes firms reluctant to hire), young workers who begin in low wage 
firms suffer significant lifetime losses on their human capital.  On the other end, those who start in 
high wage firms experience a windfall.   Thus, if firm effects dominated the market (as in Figure 
1B), then a bad initial ‘draw’ of one’s firm has a huge income effect for the rest of the worker’s 
career.   
In this context, if all of the variation in wages within firms were accounted for by person 
effects, then there would be constancy over time in a worker’s position in the firm, given his initial 
position.  Workers care that their position can improve in the firm as a result of experience and 
promotion.  If there is no within-firm residual variation, then the only way for a worker to improve 
his relative position is to move.  Given our evidence on the high levels of variance of individual 
wage growth rates within firms, the data suggests significant promotions and little evidence of 
getting stuck in one position, but further work expanding on these points would be highly valuable.
15 
                                                 
15 One interesting extension is to estimate wage growth models as a function of individual specific fixed effects in wage 
growth rates.     27
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Table 1: Country Classifications by Type of Data 
 
 
Data Type  Country Details 
United States - All firms, all employees, wages plus 
bonuses, quarterly data annualized 
Denmark - All firms, all employees, wages plus bonuses, 
annual (November) 
All private firms, all 
employees 
Netherlands – all firms (including non-profit, government), 
all employees, wage plus bonses, annual (September) 
Finland - Employer association (TT) (large firms), all 
employees, wages plus bonuses, annual 
Belgium - Random sample of firms, all employees, 1995, 
wages plus bonuses, annual 
Firms in employer 
associations, all 
employees 
Sweden (Plant) - All industries, plants only, all employees, 
annual 
Germany – Manufacturing and services (IAB; large firms), 
plants only, top-coded wages are input, annual (June) 
Employer associations, 
plants (not firms), all 
employees  Norway - Heavy manufacturing (industry 38), all 
employees 
Italy - Private sector, large employers, permanent 
employees, 1/90 sample of workers, annual (May) 
All private firms, 
sample of employees 
France - All firms, 1/25 sample of workers in firms, wages 
plus bonuses 
Norway - White collar, employer association (NHO), 
manufacturing and services (more manufacturing), all 
employees, wage plus bonuses 
Firms in employer 
associations, all 
employees, but only 
white or blue collar  Sweden (Firm) - White collar, employer association (SAF)
Blue collar, employer association (SAF) 
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Table 2: Models of wage setting that would produce Figures 1A and 1B 
 
   Wages vary within firms: 
Broad dispersion of skill or 
effort within the firm. 
Wages vary across firms: 
Workers sort into firms 
based on their skill or effort 
levels. 
  Figure 1A:  All firms alike, 
but high within-firm wage 
dispersion. 
0 ; . = =
l w j w w σ  
Figure 1B: All workers 
paid same within firm; 
firms differ in mean wages. 
; , ; 0 ; low w w
l l w w j σ σ > ≠  
Wage setting based on 
occupation (human 
capital skills). 
All firms have a broad 
distribution of occupations 
within the firm (same 
distribution of human 
capital). 
Wage structures differ 
across firms because there 
is one occupation per firm. 
Workers sort into firms by 
occupation or by skill level. 
Wage setting based on 
wage policy aimed 
incentive pay (e.g. 
piece rates or 
tournaments) or at 
wage compression. 
Workers identical skills; 
tournament or piece rates 
create pay dispersion.  Or 
workers differ in ambition, 
but distribution of types 
identical in every firm. 
Workers sort across firms 
according to preferences for 
piece rate pay. Narrow 
wage dispersion implies no 
tournaments; there is pay 
compression within the 
firm. 
Institutional wage 
setting (such as 
unions) for sharing 
rents between worker 
and firm. 
All firms have a broad 
distribution of occupations 
or job titles on which 
wages are based, or a steep 
seniority structure on which 
wages are based. 
Wage structures differ 
across firms because 
workers sort by occupation, 
or because pay is a function 
of the profitability of the 
firm.  
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Figure 1A
Within firm variation; No between firm variation
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Figure 2: Positive Correlation in With-Firm Mean Wages and Variance 
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Figure 4:
Ratio of the Average Within-Firm Standard Deviation of Wages 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   
employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, 
but only white or blue collar
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Figure 5:
Ratio of the Standard Deviation of the Mean Wages of Firms 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, but 
only white or blue collar
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Figure 6: Ratio of the Standard Deviation of the 
Mean Wages of Firms to the Standard Deviation of 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, but 
only white or blue collar
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Figure 8: Correlation of the Within-Firm Standard Deviation of log(Wages) 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, but 
only w hite or blue collar
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Figure 9: Difference Between Exit Rate of Workers 
Whose Wages are in the 90th Percentile of Wages 
Within the Firm for Workers in Firms with Compressed 
Wages, Minus the Exact Rate for Workers in 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, but 
only white or blue collar
"Compressed Wages" means the firm's wage variance is below the median. "Non-compressed" meanst eh firm's wge variance is above the median.
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Standard Deviation  40





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Wage growth = log(waget) - log(waget-1), annual change 
Percent
      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   
employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, 




























































































































Figure 13: The 90th Percentile and the 10th Percentile of the Distribution 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 14: Difference in Wage Growth by Tenure Group: 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, but 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 17: Entry Rate for Workers in the Firm for those Workers in the Top 90th Percentile of 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 18: Exit Rates of Workers From 
Big Firms (Employees ≥ 100) 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   
employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, 
but only white or blue collar
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Figure 19: Entry Rate Minus Exit Rate of Workers in all Firms 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































      All private firms, all employees
      
      Firms in employer associations, all employees
      
      Employer associations, plants only, all   
employees
      All private firms, sample of employees
      Firms in employer associations, all employees, 
but only white or blue collar
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Figure 20: Correlation of the Firm's Exit Rate and Wage Change and 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All employees in the population for __ 
states, based on Unemployment Insurance 
records filed quarterly with every state. 
 
IDA Bdatabase kept by Statistics 
Denmark.   
This is a longitudinal database from 
1980-2001. 
Register data supplemented with data 
from the 1970 Census and reports from 
all educational institutions (educational 
register). 
Social Statistical Database of jobs (SSB 
Banen) kept by Statistics Netherlands.  
This is an event history database of all 
employment relationships bringing 
together information from tax and social 
security authorities combined with 
demographic information about Dutch 
inhabitants and their households from the 





All employees age __ for plants of size 
greater than __. 
Workers are included in analysis if real 
monthly earnings exceed $100 and are 
less than $100,000. 
 
All Workers 18-66 years of age and all 
workplaces and enterprises. The link 
between workers and employer is 
established every year on a day in 
November. Data used are only on primary 
employment.   
 
All firms (incl. non-profit and 




For each person: gender, age, 
compensation. 
For each establishment can calculate 
wage and entry and exit given all person-
level data for the establishment. 
 
Demographics, education, labor market 
experience, tenure and earnings. 
 













Earnings are from UI wage records. UI 
wage records measure “gross wages and 
salaries, bonuses, stock options, tips, and 
other gratuities, and the value of meals 
and lodging, where supplied” (U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 1997a, p.44). They do not 
include OASDI, health insurance, 
workers compensation, unemployment 
insurance, and private pension and 
welfare funds.  
 
Gross hourly wages, with bonuses and 
overtime. Register data containing tax-
based information on the total earnings 
paid to each individual worker during the 
year (considered high quality data). 
Earnings are for the employer in 
November. 
Wage records constitute deductible labor 
costs for the employers, what makes 
information more reliable). 
Working hours: IDA computes annual 
number of working hours from 
Gross monthly wages including bonuses. 
Data contains tax-based information on 
total earnings per individual and firm 
combination. Earnings are calculated for 
the most important employer only, if 
multiple employers exist. Monthly wages 
have been calculated on the basis of the 
annual salary multiplied with fraction of 
months worked.  
  51
employer=s contributions to the pension 
scheme (contributions to the pension 
scheme are proportional to the number of 
hours worked). Hourly wage rates are 
calculated by dividing the earnings at a 
particular employer with the estimated 




Entry (accession) and Exit (separation) 
rates reflect links across years for unit of 
observations defined as PIK SEIN year 
observations (persons linked to an SEIN 
in a given year). 
Entry refers to workers who have zero 
earnings with SEIN in prior year (t-1) and 
have positive earnings in current year (t). 
Workers are only counted for purposes of 
computing rates if they satisfy above 
earnings thresholds. Note however that a 
worker who has positive earnings in year 
t-1 and t but in one year earnings do not 
satisfy thresholds is not counted as an 
entrant. 
 
Entry rate calculated as the proportion of 
new employees in the firm in the end-of-
November year t as compared to mean 
employment in firm over the year. 
Entry rate calculated as the proportion of 
new employees in the firm during the 




No measure.   
Tenure is calculated as contiguous time 
employed at workplace, firm and 
industry. 
Tenure is calculated based on the first 
day employment (as observed by the 
fiscal authorities) relative to the third 
Thursday in September of a year (cut date 
for annual data). 
 
Mobility: Exit rate 
Exit refers to workers who have positive 
earnings in year t at SEIN and zero 
earnings in year t+1. Workers are counted 
for purposes of computing rates if they 
satisfy above earnings thresholds. Note 
however that a worker who has positive 
earnings in year t-1 and t but in one year 
earnings do not satisfy thresholds is not 
counted as an exit. 
Note the timing difference – entry refers 
to flow into firm from t-q to t; exit refers 
to flow out of firm from t to t+1. Hence, 
inappropriate to compute net flow from 
entry and exit given timing differences. 
 
Exit rates are calculated as the proportion 
of employees who have exited from the 
firm over the year (*since the 
comparisons are between end-of-
Novembers, and this will neglect 
intermittent short-term jobs, the entry rate 
and exit rates are downward biased.)  
Exit rate calculated as the proportion of 
employees leaving a firm during the 
calendar year (t) compared to previous 
















Wage survey of the Confederation of 
Finnish Industry (TT) – about 30% of 
private sector employees. 
Complete wage records on blue and white-
collar workers are available from 1980-
2002. 
Excludes top management. 
 
2 Surveys conducted by Statistics Belgium 
and merged using the form social security 
number: 
$  1995 Structure of Earnings Survey 
(SES) 
$  1995 Structure of Business Survey 




RAMS provided by Statistics Sweden 
contains data on all individual workers 
that were employed at each plant 




All employees in all large TT member 
firms, excludes small firms with less than 
25 employees. Most TT firms are in 
manufacturing and construction. Excludes 
top-management and trainees. 
Workers whose usual weekly hours exceed 
30. 
All persons age greater than 15. 
 
All firms with 10+ workers. Economic 
activity in mining and quarrying, 
manufacturing, electricity and water 
supply, construction, wholesale and retail 
trade; repair of motor vehicles, 
motorcycles and personal and household 
goods, hotels and restaurants, transport, 
storage and communication, financial 
intermediation, and real estate, renting and 
business activities.  
Final sample=34,969 individuals in 1,498 
firms. 
 
16-65 years of age residing in Sweden 
sometime between 1990 and 2000, ages 
16-60 in 1985 and ages 16-64 in 1989. 
This paper is focused on the corporate 
sector, including only establishments 
with at least 25 employees. 
Annual data (November). 
Workers employed full time, in job with 




Worker demographics and details on all 
forms of compensation. Annual data 
(December). 
 
SES: firm characteristics and individual 
employee demographics. 
SBS: (firm level survey) sales, value 
added, production value, gross operating 
surplus and value of purchased goods and 
services. 
 
Total annual earnings, first and last 
salaried month for each employee. Year 
of birth, gender, education and 
immigration status for each individual. 








Data analyzed was mainly from 1981, 




1985-2000, more detailed for 1986, 1990, 
1995 and 2000. 





Gross hourly wages, with bonuses and 
overtime, and real wage 2000. Payroll 
records. Blue-collar workers (hourly wage) 
from the last quarter of each year, and 
white-collar workers (monthly salary) 
from each December.  
Wage is calculated with all wage 
components (bonuses, overtime, etc.) and 
dividing the total wages by total hours. 
White collar worker wages: hourly wages 
are calculated based on monthly wages 
and usual weekly hours. 
All wages are deflated to year 2000 euros 
using the consumer price index. 
Wage dynamics obtained by calculating 
the firm averages in year t and t-1, taking 
the difference, and then the across firm 
average of these differences.  This 
calculation does not necessarily have the 
same employees in both years. 
Gross hourly wages -without bonuses- 
calculated by dividing total gross earnings 
(including overtime and premiums) in the 
reference period by the corresponding 
number of total paid hours (including paid 
overtime).  
Gross hourly wage - with bonus - 
calculated by adding to the gross hourly 
wages (without bonuses) the annual 
bonuses dived by: i) the number of months 
to which the bonuses correspond and ii) 
the number of total paid hours in the 
reference period, respectively. Thus, in 
Average wage, observation = a person the 
individual grossly hourly wages (in EUR) 
include overtime paid, premiums for shift 
work, night work and/or weekend work. 
 
Monthly wage is calculated by dividing 
total earnings during the year by the 
number of remunerated months, including 
only employment spells that cover 
November of each year. 
Employment definition: a person is 
employed if and only if the wage for 
November exceeds 75% of the mean 
wage of a janitor employed by a local 
municipality according to Statistics 
Sweden=s information on monthly wages. 
An individual is only allowed to be 
employed by one plant each year and 
priority is given to the observation 
generating the highest wage. 
Dataset is based in information collected 
to calculate taxes. 
Data contains earnings of all employees 
including CEO:s (possible outliers) 
wages of the top earners (see table 2) 
have a large impact on the standard 
deviation of monthly wages while the 




Wage growth and entry rates calculated 
from year t-1 to t. Wage growth for the 
workers that enter the firm as well as the 
wage growth by tenure are calculated 
using the information on the date when the 




When calculating wage change or plant 
change, they only counted those who 
switched between firms that were 25+ 
employees (if the firm size was less, the 
subject was dropped). 
  




Tenure is calculated within the sample 
(tenure = the number of consecutive years 
a person has his/her main employment at 
the same plant). Thus, the fraction on 
long tenured workers may be lower than 
if calculated from the year of hiring since 
tenure is broken by absence and only the 
main employer is used.  
  
Calculated from the year t to the year t+1. 
  
Calculated exit rates will not include  
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Any restrictions on the firm size (25 
employees) will refer to the base year.  
Therefore, it is not required that a firm 
would have had at least 25 employees or 
even that a firm would have existed in year 
t-1 or year t+1. 
Not available.  plant closings because the authors require 
that establishments have at least 25 

















conducted by the Institute for Employment 
Research (since 1993). (annual survey 
sample based on a register of the Federal 
Employment Service -entry, exits, and 
wages are all mandatory reports  for the 
social security system). 
Employees: all employees in Germany 
covered by the social insurance and who 
work at least one day in a plant of the 
IAB-Establishment panel in the respective 
year. 
Data sets are linked employer-employee 
from administrative files from Statistics 
Norway. Plant level information is from 
the annual census for manufacturing. 
White collar data sets are from the 
Confederation of Norwegian Business and 
Industry (NHO). Blue collar data sets from 
the Federation of Norwegian 
Manufacturing Industries (TBL). 
 
WHIP dataset (Workers Histories Italian 
Panel) by LABORatorio R. Revelli. It is 
built from a randomized sample drawn 
from INPS, the Italian National Social 
Security Institute. More info at 
www.laboratoriorevelli.it/whip. 




The register covers more than 90% of all 
employees in the manufacturing and 75% 
in the service sector.   
Excluded: Civil servants, self-employed 
and those not eligible for s.s.; apprentices; 
switchers from part to full time and 
opposite. Aall employees in plants with a 
valid interview in the respective years and 
at least 25 full time workers. 
Number of observations varies from year 
to year. 
Workers are age 15-65. 
White collar sample: All workers in all 
NHO member firms; N=97,000 white 
collar workers per year in different 
industries during the period 1980-1997. 
Restrictions on white collar sample: the 
number of hours worker per week is 30+ 
(full-time only); the number of full time 
employed white collar workers (ages 16+) 
in each firm is at least 25 in year t and in 
year t-1. 
Blue collar sample: N=34,000 blue collar 
workers per quarter. Data managed much 
the same way as white collar workers. 
Employees ages 14-75. 
INPS archives: 
Employee population: all dependent 
workers in the non agricultural private 
sector. 
Firms population: all firms in the non 




A sample is drawn selecting all 
employees born in four fixed dates of the 
year (sample rate ~1:90), and matching 
them with all firms where they have been 
employed. As a result, there are ~130,000 
individuals, ~90,000 firms per year. 
 
Inclusion criteria here: individuals 
reported to have a job spell during the 
month of May of the year of interest, blue 
and white collars working full-time only; 






Primary job in June. 
Employees:  
Demographics, entries and exits, 
occupation (3-digit), gross daily precise 
wages (including all bonus payments), an 
unique plant identifier and the industry 
code, since 1999: regional information 
- Nominal wages are deflated by the 
consumer price index and are written as 
Euros in 2000 
 
Employers:  
Detailed information about total 
employment (also for different skills), 
standard and overtime hours, wage 
recognition, output, exports, investment, 
urbanicity, ownership. 
White collar workers: organized 
hierarchically with 22 different 
combinations of groups and levels. 
 
Both plant and firm identifiers are 
available. See the section “Defining plant 
and firm” in the Norwegian chapter for 
details. 
 
The person i.d. number is used as merging 
variable when adding in plant and firm 
information from the Employer-Employee 
register. 
 
Annual data (May), full-time jobs. 
Employee 
Register: Employee id; dob; sex; place of 
birth. 
For every year and every job: Employee 
id; place of work; months paid; # salaried 
weeks/days; job start/end date; salary yr.; 
wage supplements paid by employer; 
status full time/PT/temp; code of 
contractual agreement and position in 
contractual ladder; wage supplements on 
behave of INPS (1989-). 
Employer (Firm) 
Register: Employer id; economic activity 
(NACE rev. 2, 3 digit), dates of 
registration and termination; 
For every month: # of employees, salaries 
paid, contributions paid, total days for 
which salary was paid, wage supplements 





The survey is conducted annually since 
1993 to present. In the paper only the 
years 1993, 1995 and 2000 are observed 
(meanwhile worker data are applicable 
until 2002). 









All wages are gross wages.  The 
information about wages is censored, 
because payments for the social security 
system are limited to a certain amount. 
This threshold varies from year to year. 
Thus, the observed wage at the threshold 
are imputed with predicted values using a 
Mincerian earnings function augmented by 
ten sector and ten occupation dummies and 
White collar: monthly salary (per Sept. 1
st) 
including the value of fringe benefits and 
exclusive of overtime and bonuses. 
Indirect costs to the firm such as 
employers’ fee, pensions etc. are not 
included. Nominal wages were 
transformed to real wages using the 
Consumer Price Index with base year 
1990. 
 
Defined as the total amount of the 
earnings paid to the worker: basic wage, 
cost-of-living allowance, residual fees, 
overtime plus back pay, bonuses, 
supplement holiday pay, sick pay. 
Wages reported in the tables are defined 
as average daily retributions, referring to 
a single job spell/year.  This is computed 
as the total annual wage earned in the  
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adding an error term (further details 
describes Gartner, 2005).  Varying from 
year to year 10-15% of all observations are 
imputed. In the group of employees with a 
university degree 50% of all observations 
are censored.  
firm divided by the number of paid 
working days.  Nominal daily wages are 
deflated by the CPI index and are 
expressed in 1990 Italian Liras (1 Euro 





Job tenure was computed by checking the 
appearance of the employee identifier in t, 
t-n (n 0 N) with the condition of the 
duration equal 365 (366) days. With larger 
n they have less plant observations 
because of panel attrition.  Therefore, they 
calculated the job tenures only up to 3yrs. 
Also, to be in the group job tenure >3yrs 
there must be full time employment in t 
and t-1 and the individual identifier in the 
plant must be observed in all 3 yrs. In 
addition; there has to be an annual job 
duration in these 3 yrs. of 365 (366) days. 
For each firm in year t, how many of the 
workers were not present in year t-1. This 
number is then divided by firmsize in year 
t. 
 
Job start and job end are imputed by a 
procedure that identifies continuing work 
spells of a worker within the same firm, 
taking into account possible brief 
interruptions due to suspensions, illness 
and maternity leaves, temporary layoffs. 
The procedure starts from the first year of 




  Tenure is based on the variable “job start 
date”, i.e. the date when the worker was 
first employed with his current employer. 
Note: there is some censoring with the 
year 1978 as the censoring point. 
 
 
Mobility: Exit rate 
  They look at each firm in year t-1 and ask 
how many workers in the firm leave the 
firm by year t. This number is then divided 















DADS (Déclaration Annuelles de Données 
Sociales): longitudinal employee-firm 
matched data collected by INSEE.  
*Tax based employer mandatory reports. 
 
Swedish Employer=s Federation (SAF) 




All statutory employed persons. 
 
Final sample=13,770,082 observations, 
corresponding to 1,682,080 individuals 
and 515,557 firms. 
 
Sample selection procedure: persons born 
in October of even-numbered years. 
 
White and blue collar data is on separate 
databases-there is no way to match the 
two groups. 
There are more blue collar firms than 
white collar firms. 
Firms = every private sector industry. 
Firm = white-collar workers at a 





Demographics for each person: number of 
days worked in the firm, employment 
status (ft, pt, intermittent), sex, 
DOB+place, occupation, total net earnings 
yr, yr. Gross nominal earnings*. 
Nominal values were deflated by the 
consumer price index and are written as 
k=s of 1980 FF. 
 
GDP data presented in dollar terms. 
Data set variables include occupation, 
age, and wages. 
ALevels within firms@-white collar worker 
occupation codes used to observe 




1977, 1979, 1989, 1996 
*1987 only used when it was useful to 
compute 10-year-long differences. 
 







Minimum wage: since 1951, indexed to 
the rate of change in consumer prices and 
to the average blue collar wage rate. 
 
Total annualized net real wage (excluding 
employer and employee taxes, but 
including bonuses). French CPI used, base 
 














Based on observed firm identifier for all 
jobs starting after 1976 (first year of data). 
For jobs already started in 1976, 
imputation is based on the wage structure 
survey of 1978 (see Abowd, Kramarz and 
Margolis 1999, data appendix). 









Tenure calculations are limited by the 
entry of individual firms. 
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Appendix Table A2: The Structure of Wage Levels Within and Between Firms 
 
United States-1998 Denmark-2000 Netherlands-2003 Finland-2000 Belgium- 1995 Sweden-Hol-2000 Germany-2000
Average Wage, observation = a person 3,253 21,097 2,767 10 15 17,843 3,314
   (s.d.) (4,230) (8,674.6) (1,986) (3.46) (7.056) (7,040) (1,144.24)
   (90%-ile) (5,925) (31,858.6) (4,211) (14.82) (22.274) (26,716) (4,844.97)
   (10%-ile) (855) (12,456.) (1,485) (5.95) (9.055) (11,208) (2,175.74)
   [N - workers] [40,110,897] [1,081,555] [4,600,000] [380,644] [31,788] [860,581]
Average of firm average wage, observ = a firm (weights 
observations differently from previous row)
3,020 20,473 2,206 9.01 13.1851
   (s.d.) (2,051) (4,572.9) (1,107) (1.63) (4.018)
   (90%-ile) (5,070) (26,584.2) (3,066) (11.13) (18.037)
   (10%-ile) (1,336) (15,336.2) (1,249) (7.01) (9.317)
   [N - firms] [202,528] [13,999] [71,445] [1,863] [1,445]
Average of s.d. of wage, observ = a firm 2,434 7,065 1,135 2.29 3.7197
   (s.d.) (2,452) (2,736.6) (1,764) (.94) (3.382)
   (90%-ile) (4,888) (10,764.) (1,799) (3.6) (7.503)
   (10%-ile) (732) (3,980.4) (535.6) (1.15) (.802)
   [N - firms] [202,528] [13,995] [70,736] [1,863] [1,445]
Average Coefficient of variation of wages, observ = a firm) 0.75 0.5081 0.25 0.2531
   (s.d.) (.37) (.21) (.08) (.154)
   (90%-ile) (1.2) (.758) (.36) (.461)
   (10%-ile) (.42) (.282) (.15) (.083)
   [N - firms] [202,528] [70,736] [1,863] [1,445]
Correlation (average wage, s.d. of wage), observ = a firm 0.7856 0.672 0.7299 0.53 0.831
Average of firm average wage, observ = a plant 17,245 2,861.15
   (s.d.) (3,663) (677.69)
   (90%-ile) (22,497) (3,806.67)
   (10%-ile) (13,413) (2,007.83)
   [N - plants] [9,067] [1,569]
Average of s.d. of wage, observ = a plant 5484 818.24
   (s.d.) (2,222) (226.69)
   (90%-ile) (8,635) (1,113.54)
   (10%-ile) (2,936) (522.29)
   [N - plants] [9,067] [1,565]
Average Coefficient of variation of wages, observ = a plant 0.312 0.293
   (s.d.) (.088) (.071)
   (90%-ile) (.429) (.387)
   (10%-ile) (.2) (.196)
   [N - plants] [9,067] [1,565]
Correlation (average wage, s.d. of wage), observ = a plant 0.768 0.616
Average Wage for workers between 25 and 30, observation = a 
person
2,618 19,556 9.77 12.6091 16,258 2,832
   (s.d.) (4,325) (6,334.9) (3.08) (3.768) (4,929) (740.02)
   (90%-ile) (6,822) (27,067.9) (13.72) (17.113) (22,121) (3,688.77)
   (10%-ile) (891) (12,935.1) (5.82) (8.901) (11,009) (2,062.87)
   [N - workers] [6,589,276] [169,120] [51,046] [7,004] [138,219]
Average Wage for workers between 45 and 50, observation = a 
person
3,932 23,044 10.68 16.811 19,169 3,438.98
   (s.d.) (9,164) (8,796.8) (3.56) (8.7) (7,772) (1,204.48)
   (90%-ile) (6,989) (34,613.3) (15.24) (26.779) (29,579) (5,048.48)
   (10%-ile) (1,037) (14,731.6) (6.13) (9.98) (12,108) (2,211.54)
   [N - workers] [5,306,977] [132,563] [70,212] [4,873] [116,080] [105]   
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Appendix Table A2: The Structure of Wage Levels Within and Between Firms, continued 
Norway-Heavy 
Manufacturing-1997






Average Wage, observation = a person 18,311 95 56 21,838 15,990 10,571
   (s.d.) (5,374) (33.359) (34.28) (7,084) (5,435) (2,690)
   (90%-ile) (140.307) (92.1) (31,958.9) (23,475) (14,041)
   (10%-ile) (61.751) (29.9) (14,625) (10,400) (7,223)
   [N - workers] [25,446] [47,173] [639,671] [79,259] [296,782] [372,621]
Average of firm average wage, observ = a firm (weights 
observations differently from previous row)
16,877 85.53 50.6 20,395 15,660 10,176
   (s.d.) (2,010) (12.52) (30.2) (2,977.008) (1,908) (1,664)
   (90%-ile) (99.774) (81.3) (24,359.63) (17,970) (12,400)
   (10%-ile) (70.903) (28.7) (16,685.75) (13,329) (8,140)
   [N - firms] [139] [775] [213,493] [565] [2,493] [3,931]
Average of s.d. of wage, observ = a firm 4,026 25.87 19.3 5,566 4,895 2,112
   (s.d.) (7.117) (21.868) (1,640.82) (1,164) (656)
   (90%-ile) (34.762) (44.9) (7,421.265) (6,335) (3,012)
   (10%-ile) (16.772) (2) (3,743.561) (3,393) (1,366)
   [N - firms] [139] [731] [68,997] [565] [2,493] [3,930]
Average Coefficient of variation of wages, observ = a firm) 0.236 0.30 0.314 0.2703342 0.311 0.207
   (s.d.) (.054) (.001) (.235) (.057) (.058) (.054)
   (90%-ile) (.397) (.647) (.334) (.382) (.276)
   (10%-ile) (.221) (.051) (.204) (.235) (.145)
   [N - firms] [139] [731] [68,997] [565] [2,493] [3,930]
Correlation (average wage, s.d. of wage), observ = a firm 0.59 0.744 0.72 0.657 0.561
Average of firm average wage, observ = a plant 15,714 10,192
   (s.d.) (2,020) (1,706)
   (90%-ile)
   (10%-ile)
   [N - plants] [2,956] [4,866]
Average of s.d. of wage, observ = a plant 4,926 2,103
   (s.d.) (1,205) (663)
   (90%-ile)
   (10%-ile)
   [N - plants] [2,956] [4,865]
Average Coefficient of variation of wages, observ = a plant 0.31 0.21
   (s.d.) (.061) (.053)
   (90%-ile)
   (10%-ile)
   [N - plants] [2,956] [4,865]
Correlation (average wage, s.d. of wage), observ = a plant 0.623 0.582
Average Wage for workers between 25 and 30, observation = a 
person
16,571 83.74 48.0 17,630 13,244 10,642
   (s.d.) (2,999) (23.969) (22.819) (3,546.809) (2,813) (2,671)
   (90%-ile) (115.076) (22,202.05) (16,787) (14,143)
   (10%-ile) (59.756) (13,386.13) (10,100) (7,373)
   [N - workers] [3,781] [9,318] [117,395] [9,123] [37,423] [54,590]
Average Wage for workers between 45 and 50, observation = a 
person
19,338 105.80 67.3 23,262 17,699 11,020
   (s.d.) (5,959) (35.541) (39.133) (7,844.934) (5,949) (2,707)
   (90%-ile) (154.642) (34,460.62) (26,395) (14,511)
   (10%-ile) (67.378) (15,250) (11,500) (7,639)
   [N - workers] [3,988] [7,489] [95,650] [13,962] [46,722] [39,175]  
See country chapters for detailed discussion of these data and variables.  
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Denmark-2000 Netherlands-2003 Finland-2000 Sweden-Hol-2000 Germany-2000 Norway-Heavy 
Manufacturing-
1997






Average change in wage observation = 
a person
0.0496 0.031 0.04464 0.03 0.048 0.018 0.024 0.02 0.017 0.031724 -0.004 -0.011
   (s.d.) (.511) (.17) (.204) (.1) (.142) (.013) (.08) (.127) (.254) (.068) (.7) (.22)
   (90%-ile) (.495) (.2) (.175) (.16) (.207) (.131) (.136) (.198) (.093) (.07) (.26)
   (10%-ile) (-.379) (-.125) (-.063) (-.1) (-.085) (-.089) (-.081) (-.142) (-.007) (-.06) (-.27)
   [N - workers] [35,607,319] [799,463] [3,800,000] [312,968] [704,360] [19,489] [43,377] [519,770] [69,210]
Average of firm average change in 
wage, observ = a firm
0.0558 0.034 0.04726 0.03 0.053 0.021 0.022 0.02 0.022 0.0298882 0.001 -0.011
   (s.d.) (.191) (.08) (.143) (.06) (.059) (.034) (.026) (.025) (.217) (.023) (.031) (.12)
   (90%-ile) (.215) (.109) (.148) (.08) (.114) (.055) (.051) (.185) (.057) (.04) (.124)
   (10%-ile) (-.112) (-.036) (-.039) (-.02) (.001) (-.012) (-.011) (-.113) (.006) (-.031) (-.139)
   [N - firms] [202,335] [11,383] [90,709] [1,321] [9,063] [139] [734] [148,995] [565]
Average of s.d. of change in wage, 
observ = a firm
0.4917 0.205 0.1567 0.09 0.126 0.07 0.065 0.11 0.114 0.0585112 0.066 0.19
   (s.d.) (.206) (.093) (.125) (.05) (.039) (.024) (.031) (.035) (.136) (.037) (.029) (.061)
   (90%-ile) (.755) (.318) (.302) (.15) (.176) (.096) (.153) (.263) (.095) (.1) (.269)
   (10%-ile) (.262) (.11) (.038) (.05) (.082) (.045) (.073) (.012) (.026) (.355) (.124)
   [N - workers] [202,335] [11,366] [85,396] [1,307] [9,054] [139] [687] [46,573] [565]
Avg change in wage for people who 
change firms, observ = a person
0.1031 0.043 0.05 0.053 n.a. 0.023 0.06 -0.004 0.02 -0.003
   (s.d.) (.786) (.313) (.16) (.213) n.a. (.14) (.244) (.441) (.097) (.267)
   (90%-ile) (.997) (.376) (.26) (.319) n.a. (.327) (.477) (.14) (.319)
   (10%-ile) (-.799) (-.296) (-.16) (-.218) n.a. (-.209) (-.487) (-.055) (-.324)
   [N - firms] [10,522,612] [240,362] [14,473] [40,217] n.a. [697] [3,496] [68,164]  
See country chapters for detailed discussion of these data and variables. 
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Wage Growth = log(waget) - log(waget-1); annual change
 
 